The purpose of this report is to offer concepts for consideration in developing infectious disease surveillance systems, defined here as active, formal, and systematic processes intentionally directed to rapidly seek out and identify infectious disease agents or disease. Performance of surveillance systems can be judged by their accuracy (sensitivity and specificity), precision (repeatability), timeliness, multiple utility, and value. Surveillance system operation and function necessary to achieve high performance are defined in part by characteristics of the specific infectious disease, including disease transition state dynamics, that define probabilities of being in the latent, infectious, or clinical phase of disease. Two key components of surveillance are the sampling scheme, which is intended to maximize the probability of capturing an infected animal or specimen as soon as possible after the herd has been exposed, and the diagnostic assays, which should maximize the probability of detecting the agent, or evidence of the agent, if it is present in the specimen, while minimizing the likelihood of a false-positive result. Proportional risk sampling, targeted sampling, and repeated sampling are strategies that can improve overall surveillance system accuracy and particularly the temporal sensitivity related to early detection. Hierarchical sampling schemes and multiplexed assays can maximize efficiency and improve utility by serving multiple surveillance systems and purposes. Development of the surveillance systems needed to address emerging and foreign animal diseases will necessarily require design and architecture that are highly probability-driven to maximize surveillance sensitivity and specificity and to minimize cost.
After the 2001 outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in the UK and heightened national and international awareness of bioterrorism, several reports have called for expanded surveillance aimed at early detection of foreign and exotic animal diseases. [1] [2] [3] [4] Little information is available, however, on the conceptual architecture and design of infectious disease surveillance systems, particularly those relating to detection of foreign animal disease (FAD) agents. In the light of new demands for biosecurity and of recent technologies that permit rapid detection of infectious agents, an investment in rethinking surveillance function and operation is indicated to encourage continued evolution of surveillance systems that would address emerging animal health needs. The purpose of this article is to offer an outline of concepts and parameters for consideration in developing infectious disease surveillance systems.
Definition of surveillance
Surveillance is defined here as an active, ongoing, formal, and systematic process aimed at early detection of a specific disease or agent in a population or early prediction of elevated risk of a population acquiring an infectious disease, with a prespecified action that would follow the detection of disease. This definition is similar to that offered by others for active surveillance, as opposed to passive surveillance. 14 The main objective of surveillance is to intentionally seek out as early as possible the target agent or disease cases or to identify an elevated risk in order to maximize prevention, treatment, control, or the likelihood of eradication and to minimize the impacts of the disease. Surveillance typically targets agents and diseases for which a rapidly directed, prespecified action at the herd or population level is warranted if the disease, agent, or elevated risk is identified. An important operational feature of surveillance, therefore, is that the system should obtain and process information rapidly, with minimal time elapsing between collection of information and communication of results. Early detection also is a function of the temporal sensitivity of the system and its ability to accurately identify an agent at any given time in a population. Surveillance system design should aim at maximizing the probability of true early detection, should the agent be present, while minimizing the probability of false-positive detection, should the agent not be present. Thus, a fundamental concept in surveillance system design and function is that the system should be highly probability-driven. Critical probability elements in maximizing surveillance accuracy are incorporated in 2 main structural components of a system. One component is the sampling architecture and design used to identify which samples, animals, or herds should be tested at what times in order to capture the agent if it is present, and the other is the accuracy of the assay employed to detect the agent in the samples obtained (i.e., the diagnostic sensitivity and specificity of the assay).
The scope and dimension of surveillance systems can vary, depending on targeted agents, populations, or risk groups. Surveillance may target an agent in a single herd or flock, or it may involve multiple assays or tests addressing several agents in many herds or locations regionally, nationally, or globally. Systems can be embedded or nested within other systems in a hierarchical design, whereby 1 system might serve as an activator to trigger initiation of a nested system. An example would be production surveillance systems that would trigger activation of infectious disease surveillance when production dropped to some threshold level, as might be envisioned for reduced egg production in layer flocks triggering testing for avian influenza or exotic Newcastle disease viruses. Covariate information, such as age or clinical stage of disease, obtained through collateral testing can improve confidence and predictability of surveillance findings. Surveillance systems can be external to the population of interest, or they can operate within the population. External, preemptive, or risk surveillance systems would be intended to protect a naive, susceptible population by identifying, or ''catching'' the agent before it enters the population and by detecting changes in risk of the disease being transmitted from an outside source into the population. Preemptive surveillance at customs involves identification and confiscation of meat products potentially harboring FMD and other FAD agents. Risk surveillance for FMD would involve repeated, regular estimation of risks of FMD entering the USA from various sources during some given time. Internal, or post facto, systems, on the other hand, would aim at detecting the agent after it has entered the population, preferably before the agent is transmitted to other animals or herds. The current program that examines culled cows for evidence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy would be an example of post facto surveillance. Although material presented hereafter applies generally to all types of surveillance, post facto surveillance will be a focus of this article.
Surveillance system performance attributes
Attributes that define surveillance system diagnostic performance, either for post facto or preemptive surveillance, generally include the accuracy, precision, rapidity, and efficiency with which the system is able to determine infection status or risk for a population. In addition, a system would be judged on its overall net value in maintaining or protecting animal health, given projected costs associated with disease in the absence of a surveillance system.
Surveillance system diagnostic sensitivity and specificity, and overall accuracy. Concepts of diagnostic sensitivity (Se) and specificity (Sp) used in assessing diagnostic assay performance apply to surveillance system performance as well. Diagnostic Se of a surveillance system, Se s , is the probability that a surveillance system will correctly identify the agent in a population when the agent is truly present (i.e., the probability of no false-negative results), and diagnostic Sp of a surveillance system, Sp s , is the probability the system will correctly note the absence of the agent when it is truly not present (i.e., the probability of no false-positive results). The diagnostic Se and Sp of a surveillance system jointly define the overall accuracy of a system and are functions both of the accuracies of the assays employed in surveillance and of the ability of the sampling scheme to capture an infected animal for testing, as described below (see ''Surveillance sampling architecture and design''). Similar analogies between assay and surveillance system performance apply for predictive values, in which the positive predictive value of a surveillance system is the probability that the agent is truly present in a population when the surveillance system generates a positive test report, and the negative predictive value is the probability that the agent is not present in a population when a system generates a negative result. Surveillance system predictive values would be related in the usual way to Se s , Sp s , and prevalence. 22 Precision, repeatability, and reproducibility. Precision of a surveillance system refers to its ability to obtain the same result for repeated sampling and testing of the system. Surveillance precision has 2 main components. One is the assay precision within the context of its operation in the surveillance system, which relates to variation in test results associated with technicians, environments, and laboratories involved. Assay precision would indicate the consistency of results when the same sample is tested by different technicians or laboratories. The other component of surveillance precision relates to the reliability of the sampling scheme in consistently capturing truly infected animals or herds; a surveillance system would be imprecise if repeated sampling failed to consistently capture animals or herds that have the agent. For example, suppose a sampling scheme for detecting herds with only a few Mycoplasma bovis-infected cows involved testing a random sample of 10% of cows with clinical mastitis from each herd. Repeated random sampling would select different cows each time, sometimes capturing and other times failing to capture a cow with M. bovis infection, resulting in an imprecise sampling scheme. The consistency with which the sampling scheme repeatedly captures infected animals would be a measure of the precision of the sampling scheme.
The process of assessing and measuring assay repeatability would involve repeated testing within and among laboratories to identify and quantify intra-and interlaboratory variation and error, which should become part of routine quality assurance programs for a surveillance system. Sampling scheme repeatability could be evaluated using modeling approaches that estimate the probability of capturing an infected animal or herd in a sample of animals or herds, given the likely prevalence of infection and the sample size.
Timeliness of detection and reporting. One measure of the effectiveness of a surveillance system is its temporal efficiency and ability to function in real time, thereby minimizing disease transmission by early detection and reporting. Because a goal of any surveillance system should be to capture and communicate specific information that will be used to make immediate disease control decisions, an important performance attribute of surveillance is that results must be communicated quickly after samples have been collected. Time-related elements of surveillance, therefore, should be designed to minimize the period between collection of samples or information and communication of results. Examples of time-related elements include the disease transition phase being targeted; time to collect and process samples; sample transportation to mobile, local, regional, or national diagnostic laboratories; turnaround times for screening and verification tests; and time required for report generation and authorization, communication, and communication verification. The term ''real-time surveillance'' implies that surveillance turnaround time from sample collection to reporting results should be measured in hours.
Efficiency and multiple utility. Surveillance efficiency and multiple utility are necessary to obtain acceptance of a surveillance system, to justify investment in surveillance, and to maximize overall value and costeffectiveness. It may be difficult to justify resources for surveillance aimed only at 1 disease, particularly when the herd or population may never acquire the disease. Resource allocation, therefore, may be more readily justified for nested surveillance systems that address multiple purposes, where design, sampling, or other components of the system can be utilized to address detection of several diseases or conditions. For example, a milk sample collected to evaluate milk composition and quality might be tested for several agents or substances related to food safety, mastitis, metabolic conditions, somatic cell count, FAD agents, or antimicrobial residues, thereby maximizing benefit from the investment in sample collection and processing. There may be several benefactors who could share in the cost of systems with multipurpose sampling, including those responsible for national or homeland se-curity, individual producers interested in improving herd production efficiency, and cooperatives or processors monitoring milk quality. Efficiencies of scale may be possible through shared equipment, technical support, facilities, and other resources.
Surveillance efficiency and utility also may be enhanced by use of assays that simultaneously test for multiple agents. Deployment of assays that permit multiple agent testing, such as multiplex systems that target indigenous disease agents for which clinical signs mimic those of FADs, would provide diagnostic surveillance for indigenous diseases of interest to producers and practitioners while providing important testing for FAD agents. For example, multiplexed, real-time PCR-based assays used in FAD surveillance involving cattle tissues could include testing for bovine viral diarrhea virus, bovine herpes viruses, and bluetongue virus, which have been termed agents of vesicular ''look-alike diseases,'' 19 as well as for FAD agents, such as FMD virus (FMDV), vesicular stomatitis virus, and malignant catarrhal fever virus. 18 Other strategies to enhance efficiency include use of the herd, rather than the individual animal, as the target and selection of a sample type or material that avoids labor-intensive, individual animal sampling, while improving the probability of detecting the agent in a given herd. Such samples might include, air, water, or milk samples, slaughterhouse fluids, or aggregate samples of urine, feces, milk, eggs, or blood, depending on the specific disease agent. For rare diseases in which most samples can be expected to test negative, pooled sample testing is an example of a sampling approach that can minimize assay costs and improve sampling efficiency. 24 Value. Depending on the surveillance scope, the perceived value of a surveillance system is a function of many factors, including direct economic, political, and social benefits of not having the disease, as well as indirect benefits accrued from testing for indigenous diseases and improved confidence of trading partners that they will not acquire the disease. These benefits would have to be balanced against the cost of the system. A decision to invest in surveillance requires value judgements, including identifying who will benefit and who should pay and assessing the worth of any ''peace of mind'' afforded by a surveillance system. Value also will depend on the estimated accuracy of the system in detecting the agent, should the agent be introduced, and the likelihood that the disease will be introduced into the population in some projected period of time.
Surveillance can have other latent benefits that may not be realized until there is a disease outbreak. For example, even though surveillance systems for FAD agents can be expected to yield negative test results most, if not all, of the time, ongoing surveillance can develop the necessary diagnostic infrastructure and resources that must be in place at the onset of an epidemic. In the face of an outbreak, adequate diagnostic resources, including well-trained technical support, animal and herd identification systems, information management, communication systems, and large samplehandling capacity, are critical in providing the realtime diagnostic capability for a potentially massive number of samples, as experienced in the UK FMD epidemic 4 and in the current exotic Newcastle outbreak in the USA. Thus, the anticipated projected value of a surveillance system also should include how investment in a surveillance system might better prepare for emergency testing, even for an unrelated disease agent, by creating the sampling and testing surge capacity that will be necessary in the face of an epidemic. 3 Other important secondary benefits that may not be recognized include enhanced cooperation and participation among parties and stakeholders involved in surveillance, including participating laboratories and government agencies, industry, producers, and practitioners. Presence of a FAD surveillance system in itself would provide an awareness of the particular FAD, thereby improving education and potentially enhancing biosecurity directed to the disease.
Design concepts and parameters defining surveillance system operation and function
The day-to-day operation of a surveillance system will be defined by the system's overall design, which incorporates numerous architectures and parameters, which in turn define how well the system will function to achieve its objective. These parameters include the disease and diagnostic transition state probabilities, sample definition and sample frames, sampling architecture, including proportional risk sampling configurations, sizes, and frequency, and the Se and Sp of screening and verification assays.
Disease transition states
Design of surveillance systems that target detection of agents, antibodies, or other indicators of infection or disease requires an understanding of the temporal sequence of disease transition states, their probabilities, and related diagnostic transition phases for the host, the herd, and the population of herds. Disease transition states for a given agent and host define the durations of the latent, infectious, and clinical periods ( Fig. 1 ), 17 which in turn relate to transition phases for specific diagnostic tests. Disease transition state durations and probabilities depend on host-and agent-specific pathogenesis, the infectiousness of the disease, the dynamics of animal-to-animal interactions and contacts within a herd, and the nature and magnitude of herd-to-herd contacts within a population.
Individual animal disease and diagnostic transition state probabilities. Host disease transition state probabilities identify the likelihood that an individual animal will be in a given disease transition state some specified time after infection was acquired. Transition state dynamics can be expected to vary according to host species, animal or herd immune status, and strain or subtype of the agent. For example, the preclinical period after natural exposure to FMD type O in pigs can be expected to be only about 6 days, on average, whereas in sheep the latent period may be 10 days or longer. 8 Figure 1 illustrates a distribution for 3 disease transition states for a hypothetical infectious disease agent, indicating the likelihood that an infected animal will be in any 1 of the disease states at some given time after natural infection with the agent. Surveillance targeting early transition states such as the infectious state will have a greater probability of early detection than surveillance targeting a later state such as the state in which the animal will show clinical signs of disease.
In contrast to disease transition states, diagnostic transition state information characterizes when in the course of disease a particular assay or test may or may not be expected to provide accurate results. Diagnostic transition state probabilities are, in essence, time-specific estimates of Se and Sp for periods after exposure, referred to here as disease transition state-specific (DTS-specific) Se or Sp. The DTS-specific Se and Sp reflect the reality that diagnostic Se or Sp of an assay can be expected to change over the course of disease, whereby the probability of agent detection (e.g., culture or PCR assays) for an infected animal may be initially low or nil during the incubation period, then increases to some maximum value over the course of the infectious transition phase. Subsequently, the Se of an assay may decline over the course of disease if Figure 2 . Disease transition state sensitivity of a PCR assay for FMDV, calculated from data reported on 4 experimentally infected steers, where sensitivity represents the proportion of infected animals that were detected by the assay. The graph illustrates how the sensitivity of detecting an infected animal can be low or nil in the early phases of disease and then increase as more infected animals enter the infectious phase and begin shedding the virus. Data were not reported for postexposure times greater than 6 days. 9 . Diagnostic transition of SN and CF antibodies to detect exposure to FMDV type A-24, illustrating 2 different patterns of diagnostic transition phases. The CF antibody pattern shows a sharp transition out of the diagnostic phase as sensitivity (antibody titer) diminished rapidly over the course of disease. The pattern for the SN antibodies shows a persistently elevated titer and a more prolonged effective diagnostic phase in which the sensitivity would be expected to remain high. Plotted from data reported elsewhere. 12 recovered animals tend not to have the agent in the tested tissue or fluid or if antibodies decay, depending on the type of assay. An example of a typically low initial Se of an assay early in the disease process is shown in Fig. 2 , in which the Se of a PCR assay to detect steers with FMD was 0 until animals began entering the infectious phase of disease and then gradually increased to 1.0 by 6 days postinfection, by which time all animals were in the infectious disease state. 9 Figure 3 illustrates the decline of Se as infectiousness begins to wane, in which the Se of detecting sheep with FMD declined from 100% to 25% by 11 to 13 days postexposure. 16 The transition state Se of an antigen detection-type assay likely will vary over the course of disease and is correlated with the probability that the agent will be present in the specimen being tested. The Se for an assay, therefore, should not be considered to be constant, as is often the case. Rather, the Se should be expected to vary according to the changing disease states, which may or may not manifest in agent or antibody expression. In addition, the probabilities of detection may differ, depending on the specific tissue or sample type being tested. The FMDV can be expected to be detected in pharyngeal-esophageal samples obtained by probang several weeks or months after infection, for example, whereas at the same time detection of the virus in saliva or blood is unlikely. 7 Thus, if diagnostic transition state probabilities (i.e., Se and Sp) are sample-or tissue-type-specific, then DTS-specific Se and Sp estimates should be available for each tissue type for designated time periods over the course of disease.
Similarly, diagnostic transition states for serologic assays would characterize a test's ability to detect agent-specific antibodies over the course of infection. The Se for serologic detection of infection with Mycobacterium avium var. paratuberculosis varies, depending on the animal's current disease state. 27 The Se is low in the preclinical, noninfectious phase and higher in the clinical, infectious phase. Diagnostic transition states also may reflect persistence of specific antibodies over the course of disease. As illustrated by plots of previously reported data ( Fig. 4 ), 12 persisting high serum-neutralizing (SN) titers to FMDV well beyond 60 days postinfection, compared with declining complement-fixing (CF) titers Ͻ1:60 by 50 days, would indicate that the probability of detecting FMDV antibodies some months after infection by an SN test would be higher than that for a CF test. The DTS- specific Se for the SN test would remain high over the course of disease, whereas that for the CF test would be expected to decline.
Knowledge of the time-and tissue-specific diagnostic transition state Se and Sp are important in understanding the likelihood of a false-negative diagnosis. It will be useful to know, for example, the probability of a false-negative FMD diagnosis based on a negative PCR test of blood from a ewe infected 5 days before the sample was taken. The likelihood of a false-negative test result will be conditional (dependent) on the time since the animal acquired the infection and on the estimated diagnostic transition state Se for that specified time. Consequently, the likelihood of a false-negative test result must be defined within some time exposure limits. Suppose, hypothetically, that the probability of a false-negative FMDV PCR test result of blood collected from a cow that acquired an FMDV infection 20 days previously is 0.8, whereas if the cow had acquired the infection only 4 days before sample collection the probability is 0.1. Confidence, or probability (P), that the cow was not infected (on the basis of PCR assay of blood only) would be much higher (P ϭ 1.0 Ϫ 0.1 ϭ 0.9) for a cow exposed 4 days before collection than for a cow exposed 20 days before collection (P ϭ 1.0 Ϫ 0.8 ϭ 0.2). These time-specific transition Se estimates would be necessary for interpreting assay results and for assessing realistically the likelihood of false-negative test results for the duration of the disease process and must be obtained during the assay validation process.
Multiple diagnostic transition state information. Use of diagnostic transition state probabilities for multiple diagnostic tests can be expected to improve overall estimates of Se and Sp and the probability of a false-negative diagnosis. For example, combining FMD diagnostic transition probabilities for antigen detection, serology, and clinical signs would improve confidence in diagnostic outcomes and decisions, particularly relating to the likelihood of a false-negative diagnosis (see also ''Verification of screening results'' and ''Collateral testing and surveillance and covariate predictors''). Suppose that serology and antigen detection are both negative for samples from an infected cow showing no clinical signs of FMD 5 days after becoming infected with the virus. Also assume, for illustration purposes, that 5 days after exposure the probability that an FMDV-infected cow would show clinical signs was 0.3, the probability of detecting the virus in saliva was 0.5, and the probability of detecting SN antibodies was 0.2. Considering each of the 3 diagnostic ''tests'' alone, the probabilities of a false-negative test result for clinical signs, virus detection, and SN antibody detection would be 0.7 (1 Ϫ 0.3), 0.5 (1 Ϫ 0.5), and 0.8 (1 Ϫ 0.2), respectively. If these tran-sition state Se values are considered jointly, however, the probability of a false negative diagnosis, whereby none of the tests is positive, is (0.7)(0.5)(0.8) ϭ 0.28. This probability (0.28) of a false-negative diagnosis is much smaller than for any of the 3 tests considered individually. Thus, joint consideration of transition state Ses for multiple tests will provide greater confidence in diagnostic outcomes and more information about the likelihood of infection.
Knowledge of the disease transition state probabilities for a given agent and host also define functional performance and limitations of the surveillance system with respect to diagnostic lag or delay periods. Figure  5 illustrates the likelihood of cattle and pigs first shedding virus and of first appearance of lesions after natural exposure to FMD type O virus. 8 If a FMD surveillance system relied on recognition of clinical signs as the initial screening test, one might expect that the diagnostic delay period would be 6-7 days, on average, between exposure and appearance of lesions, or longer, depending on how much time could elapse between observation of lesions and reporting of disease. 25 Use of an antigen detection test aimed at the preclinical, infectious period might diminish the lag period to 4-5 days on average (Fig. 2) , and use only of the CF test might extend the diagnostic lag time to 10 days or more ( Fig. 4) . Ideally, post facto surveillance systems targeting individual animals should be designed to identify the agent as soon as possible after the animal has been exposed, thus minimizing the detection lag period. Knowledge of how long infection can be latent or how long an animal can be infectious and thus detectable by a detection system is important prerequisite information for system design and in un- derstanding how well the system can be expected to perform in detecting an agent as early as possible.
Herd-level disease transition state probabilities. In contrast to disease transition state probabilities for an individual animal, herd-level disease transition state probabilities indicate the proportion of animals within a herd that are expected to be in the various disease states at some given time after herd exposure. These probabilities represent the likelihood that the surveillance sampling scheme would capture an animal in a particular disease state in a herd some specified time after the herd was infected. The duration and rate of change of herd disease transition states will be driven by the intraherd transmission rate, where the greater the transmission within the herd, the more rapidly the herd will move from relatively few animals to relatively many animals in a subsequent disease state. Intraherd transmission rates will vary from herd to herd, depending on 3 main elements of infectious disease transmission: 1) infectiousness of the disease for the specific host species, referred to as the coefficient of infection (ß), 2) the contact rate, or number of effective contacts between infectious and susceptible animals per time period (k), and 3) the duration of the infectious period for the specific host (d). 17 The ability of an infectious agent to be transmitted through a susceptible population is often measured by the basic reproduction number (R 0 ), which represents the expected number of new infections resulting from contact with an index case animal and is calculated as R 0 ϭ ßdk.
An example of herd transition state information for the infectious state of FMD is given in Fig. 6 . The projected number of cattle shedding FMDV was modeled for a dairy herd for a period beginning 10 days after the herd was exposed, assuming that the herd diagnosis of FMD was made when 1% of the animals had clinical signs or lesions. 11 In this example, about 20% (200 cows) of the herd was projected to be infectious at the time the herd diagnosis was made if the effective contact rate was about 2.5 animals per hour and over 40% if the contact rate was 9 animals per hour. These and other data 20 illustrate how intraherd transmission is strongly affected by the extent of animal-to-animal contact and is expected to vary among herd types with the same species of animals, depending on such management differences as stocking density, within-herd movements, and nature of physical facilities. 20 Thus, some understanding of herd management is useful in developing herd-level transition state probability distribution functions.
Intraherd transmission rates also are an important consideration in surveillance because they can affect the overall surveillance system Se. For any given sampling interval or frequency, a surveillance system would have a higher probability of detecting the agent in herds with a high rate of transmission than in herds with a low rate of transmission because herds with a high rate would have a higher proportion of detectable, infected animals at a given time than herds with a low rate.
Knowledge of the proportion of infected animals that might be detectable early in the course of herd infection (i.e., herd disease transition state probability) is important in determining sample size and sampling frequency necessary for early detection of a positive herd. Early in the course of herd infection, when the prevalence of animals with detectable agent is very low, a larger sample size would be required to detect 1 infected animal, compared with later in the herd infection process, when the prevalence of infectious animals would be higher, as shown in Fig. 6 . Knowledge of how many infected animals might be detectable, as estimated from herd-level disease transition probabilities, can be applied in estimating sample sizes necessary to detect an infected herd, with some level of confidence, at a specified time after the herd became infected.
Population-level disease state transition probabilities. Design of national surveillance systems requires an understanding of disease transition state probabilities for the population of herds within the specified country. Population-level transition state probability functions characterize the proportion of herds in the population that can be expected to be in a given disease transition state at a given time after the population first becomes exposed. In contrast to herd-level tran- Figure 7 . Time from first appearance of lesions to reporting of FMD and duration of lesions for herds studied in the 1951 outbreak of FMD in Canada, illustrating population-level transition state probability (cumulative proportion) for reporting FMD once signs are apparent and for persistence of lesions in affected herds. Plotted from data reported elsewhere. 25 sition states, population-level transition state probability functions will relate conceptually to the population R 0 , which is a function of transmission of the agent among herds and of the duration of infectiousness for a herd. To gain some appreciation of population-level transition state probability distributions, information is needed for the likelihood of herd-to-herd contact.
Other population-based data can help derive probability estimates for time-related events that will provide useful information about expected population diagnostic transition phases. Figure 7 represents distributions of diagnostic delay times from first appearance of lesions to reporting of disease, and the likely duration of lesions on farms, as modeled using data reported from the Canadian FMD epidemic of 1951-1952. 25 These data provide a means of assessing the likelihood of disease being reported in the population, given compatible lesions are present at a given time. In this case, about 50% of the herds reported the disease within 5 days after lesions first appeared, but about 10% reported the disease more than 10 days after lesions were first noticed.
Specimen definition and sampling frame
Surveillance specimen and sampling frame definitions provide specific descriptions of the material to be obtained and of the animals, environments, and herds that are to be targeted by the surveillance system. The specimen definition should describe the specific material to be obtained physically, such as the type and amount collected (e.g., nasal swab, urine, milk, EDTA blood, vesicular fluid, epithelium, clotted blood, etc.), the number of replicates or subsamples to be collected, the number in pooled or composite samples, and when and how often the specimen will be collected. Standard operating procedures for sample collection and processing should be designed such that the probability of capturing a detectable agent, should it be present, is maximized, and the probability of contamination with the same or related agents is minimized. Proposed sample materials also should include those appropriate for subsequent verification testing, as necessary, to confirm that positive results of an initial screening assay are not false.
The sampling frame should provide a list and description of all herds, premises, environments, or locations that will be considered within the scope of the surveillance sampling as well as a list or description of the sampling units (e.g., animals, bulk tank milk, bedding, feed, etc.) within each herd or location. The sampling units constitute the specific target of the procedures described to collect tissue or other material for testing. Sampling frame descriptions should be sufficiently detailed to permit proportional risk sampling, as described below, whereby high-risk herds and highrisk animals or materials within herds are specifically targeted for sampling.
It is not feasible or practical for most surveillance systems to test or screen daily each animal in each herd in a state or country. Consequently, the animals and herds omitted from the sampling frame will define some of the functional limitations of a surveillance system. To fully understand these limitations, elements of the sample and sampling frame definition should be carefully developed and defined to address the specific objective of the surveillance system while maximizing Se s and Sp s and minimizing costs. For example, suppose a herd sample frame for FMD surveillance included mainly herds serviced by veterinarians and the animal sampling frame included only those animals showing clinical signs compatible with FMD. The functional scope of such a surveillance system would be limited to the subsample of herds in the population that had veterinary oversight and to the subsample of animals within those herds that had lesions or signs resembling FMD. By virtue of the sampling frame definition, therefore, the surveillance system would not be able to assess FMD status in the other herds that were not serviced by veterinarians. Moreover, because the sample frame definition was restricted only to animals with clinical disease, the surveillance system also would not be functionally capable of detecting infected herds with animals that did not have signs of FMD, even in herds serviced by veterinarians. Thus, both sample frame restrictions (clinical cases and herds serviced by veterinarians) would contribute to a reduction in Se s .
Assay sensitivity and specificity. Important probability elements of a surveillance system are the accuracies of the screening and verification tests employed in the system. The most commonly used measures of a test or assay's accuracy are the sensitivity (Se A ) and specificity (Sp A ), which are the respective estimates of the probability the test will correctly identify true positive and true negative samples. Estimates of Se A and Sp A , and the confidence intervals for the estimates, are obtained through the process of assay validation. A test that has undergone a validation process is not necessarily accurate or ''valid''; rather, ''validation'' indicates the test has undergone appropriate bench and field testing to obtain estimates and confidence limits for the true values of Se A and Sp A . 21 The validation process must include testing of samples from both naturally infected and uninfected animals, with sample types and environments representative of those to which the assay will be applied. Related agents and those with a potential for cross-reaction should be evaluated as well to obtain realistic assessment of Sp A . In addition to providing actual estimates of Se A and Sp A , the validation process also should provide estimates of the limits of confidence in those estimates. These limits indicate a likely (most probable) minimum and maximum value for Se A and Sp A and represent the degree of certainty, or uncertainty, one would have in the Se A and Sp A estimates. If estimates of Se A and Sp A were based on a small validation sample size, for example, confidence intervals can be expected to be wide, leading to more uncertainty about the true value of Se A and Sp A , compared with estimates derived from a large validation sample. For example, the Se for detection of FMD in 2 of 3 sheep infected with FMDV 9 would be 0.67 (2/3), and the 95% confidence interval would be 0.67 Ϯ 1.96[(0.67)(1 Ϫ 0.67)/3] 1/2 ϭ 0.14-0.999. Such a wide range between 14% and 99% would indicate considerable uncertainty in the ability to detect sheep with FMD. Thus, diagnostic test accuracy inherently has 2 key elements of probability in a surveillance system, 1 being the estimate of Se A (or Sp A ) itself, and the other being an estimate of the likelihood that the real value of Se A (or Sp A ) could be considerably smaller or larger.
Verification of screening results Verification involves joint testing or retesting of the same samples using an assay or test that is different from the screening test. The purpose of verification is to maximize the probability of a correct diagnosis. The decision to use a verification test depends on the Se A and Sp A of both the screening and verification assays, the specific objective of the surveillance system, the prevalence of the agent, the likelihood of cross-reacting agents in the animals being tested (i.e., the probability of a falsepositive test result), and the costs and consequences associated with false-positive and with false-negative test results. 26 The verification assay should provide a different, or independent, biologic measure of the disease or agent from that provided by the screening as-say. For example, a CF test measures different antibodies than an SN test, and an immunoperoxidase test for antigen in tissues measures a different biologic marker of disease from an ELISA that measures circulating antibodies.
For agents or diseases with major consequences, a highly sensitive screening test is usually preferred to ensure that all infected animals or herds are identified, even at the expense of falsely identifying some uninfected animals as infected. Depending on the disease, an accepted cost of using such an assay might be the destruction of false-positive animals to be certain that all infected animals were identified and removed. To minimize the likelihood of false-positive test results, a verification test, or tests, should be conducted on testpositive samples, using a very specific assay for which the probability of correctly identifying truly uninfected samples (e.g., Sp A ) is higher than that of the screening assay. This approach is referred to as serial testing. Parallel testing involves the simultaneous testing of samples with 2 (or more) different assays and is used to increase sensitivity rather than to verify a previous test result. 26 
Collateral testing and surveillance and covariate predictors
Confidence in and verification of surveillance results may be enhanced if covariate information is available to improve interpretation of the diagnostic test result. For example, information on status of infection with indigenous agents that produce lesions or clinical signs mimicking those of a FAD can provide additional diagnostic information that will bear on the probability of a false-negative or false-positive test result for the target agent. If samples obtained from oral lesions of a sheep were negative for FMDV (the targeted agent) and positive for the soremouth (contagious ecthyma) virus, for example, one would have more confidence that the sheep did not have FMD than if no information were available for soremouth infection. Conversely, one would have more confidence in a clinical diagnosis of FMD if a test for soremouth virus was negative than if a test for soremouth virus had not been conducted at all.
Other types of covariate information, such as age or clinical condition, also may improve confidence in diagnostic results for a specific agent or disease. For example, confidence that a negative Johne's serologic test result represented a truly uninfected animal would be greater for a 6-year-old cow with no clinical signs of Johne's disease, compared with a yearling heifer with no clinical signs. In this example, age and clinical signs both could be considered covariates to improve predictability of infection for a given Johne's disease test result.
Collateral surveillance for indigenous agents also may improve acceptance and use of regional or national surveillance by producers and veterinarians and thus improve overall surveillance system performance. 18, 19 Producers and veterinarians may be more inclined to submit samples for testing when they obtain some direct benefit from information that will help them solve their day-to-day animal health problems. Collateral surveillance for indigenous agents, such as those causing endemic disease believed to be associated with a current herd health problem, could augment producer and practitioner participation and compliance in a surveillance program. Collateral testing could be a part of other surveillance systems nested within a larger system.
Surveillance sampling architecture and design
The overall accuracy of a surveillance system in detecting truly infected and truly uninfected animals or herds, the Se S and Sp S , is a function not only of the assays or tests being employed but also of the sampling architecture and design. Key sampling elements include sample sizes, the sampling or subsampling procedures and frequency, and the types of animals or herds targeted for sampling. Collectively, the sampling architecture, which relates to the specific herds and animals within herds that will be sampled and the timing of the sampling, could be thought of as the surveillance system engine that functions to drive the process of agent capture (or of capturing animals with specific antibody) if the agent is present in the population. Even if a surveillance system employs an assay with perfect sensitivity (Se A ϭ 100%), the accuracy of a surveillance system in identifying truly infected animals or herds would be less than 100% if the sampling scheme failed to capture the infected herd, the infected animal within the herd, and the agent within the sample being tested from the infected animal.
Physically obtaining samples and material for testing. The overall Se of a surveillance system will depend in part on the likelihood that the agent is contained in the samples presented to the assay for testing. That is, the sampling process that physically obtains material for testing may not always capture the agent from an infected animal. Consider, for example, a sample collection process for salmonella surveillance of cattle wherein 10 g of feces is collected from each animal and 0.05 g of feces is transferred via a swab to a culture plate. For purposes of illustration, assume that 1) 10 g of feces would be expected to capture a single salmonella bacterium in 95% of all animals infected with salmonella because some infected animals can be expected to shed very low numbers of bacteria, 2) 80% of the swabs that transfer material from a 10g sample containing salmonella actually deposit a sal-monella bacterium on the culture plate, and 3) the sensitivity of the culture procedure to detect a salmonella bacterium present in the material transferred by the swab is 0.90. The probability that the infected animal will be identified as having salmonella can be estimated as the product of the individual probabilities of sampling and transfer and the Se of the culture method or (0.95)(0.80)(0.90) ϭ 0.68. In this example, the Se of the overall diagnostic system, including sample collection, transfer, and testing, would be only 68%, which is considerably less than the 90% one might assume if only assay sensitivity were considered. The probability of detecting the agent can be increased by collecting and testing multiple samples, by collecting larger samples and using multiple transfer samples (submitted, J. Vet. Diag. Invest), or by other procedures, such as homogenization if agent clumping is suspected. 10 Similarly, even if an assay with perfect specificity (Sp A ϭ 100%) is used, the overall Sp S of a surveillance system would be diminished if the sampling procedure resulted in cross-contamination of samples.
Proportional risk sample selection. Proportional risk sampling is a design strategy that intentionally targets high risk groups in an effort to maximize the probability that the sample of animals or herds tested will contain the agent if the agent is present in the population. 14, 15 Proportional risk sampling resembles stratified sampling, wherein animals are sampled from strata representing defined risk groups for the disease, and the number of animals representing each risk strata in the sample is proportional to the risk associated with each group. The overall Se S of a surveillance system would be diminished if those animals or herds likely to have the infection are not included in the sampling frame and are thus not specifically targeted for sampling. For example, suppose samples tested in an FMD surveillance system were obtained only from herds serviced by veterinarians. Compared with herds with little or no veterinary service, these sampled herds would probably be at a lower risk of acquiring FMD because owners would be more health conscious and more likely to practice biosecurity, which would help prevent FMD from entering the herd. Ideally, high-risk populations, such as contract calf ranches that house calves from multiple dairies or backyard game bird flocks that frequent swap meets, would be more likely to acquire the FMDV and exotic Newcastle disease virus, respectively, via the multiple exposures to other herds or flocks, or to foster interherd/flock transmission of the virus. 6 These types of herds would be sampled more often or with a greater intensity (larger sample size), compared with other types of herds that are less likely to acquire the disease.
In addition to sampling herds with a high risk of Table 1 . Sample size* necessary to be 90% and 95% confident that 1 or more infected animals will be detected in a herd or flock. acquiring a specific infection, preferential sampling also may be directed to herds or populations with a high risk of disseminating the agent, which with respect to FMD could include sale yards as well as contract calf ranches. Purposeful, preferential sampling may be directed to specific age groups, such as for BSE or Johne's surveillance, in which evidence of infection is more likely to be detected in old animals. The failure of a surveillance system to capture highrisk animals or herds, which are the ones most likely to acquire the infection, will diminish the probability that the surveillance system will be successful in meeting the objective of early detection of an infected animal or herd. Surveillance system sampling, therefore, should be weighted heavily in favor of animals, herds, or management types for which there is a high risk of acquiring or disseminating the agent. The degree of risk associated with a particular attribute can be estimated using traditional methods of risk assessment or using less formal, more subjective approaches. One alternative method applies ''expert opinion,'' wherein an estimate of risk is obtained from a composite of assessments provided by experts. 5 Estimates can be modified as needed to address current realities for risk.
Sampling frequency. Sampling frequency or rate refers to the number or proportion of sampling units, such as herds, flocks, or animals, being tested over some measure of time. Repeat sampling rate refers to the number of specimens, animals, or herds that are retested per unit of time. Generally, the sampling rate influences overall surveillance Se, and particularly temporal and cumulative Se, in that frequent testing is not only more likely to detect an agent early but is also more likely to eventually detect the agent, compared with infrequent testing. The selected rate of sampling will depend on disease and diagnostic transition state durations, intraherd/flock transmission rate, the risk of an animal or herd acquiring the agent between samplings, and the costs associated with frequent testing and with failure of early detection. Sampling rates should be higher (more frequent) for diseases with shorter latent periods, which are associated with earlier shedding of infectious agent and thus earlier transmission to other animals and herds, compared with diseases with a long latent period. Frequent sampling also would be indicated if the diagnostic assay has a low Se early in the initial disease transition states, indicating a relative inability to detect the agent early in the course of disease, compared with an assay that has a higher Se during the early disease phases. For populations with a potentially high R 0 , where the disease would be transmitted rapidly, sampling rates would need to be higher than those for populations with less potential for within-herd transmission. The sampling rates should be considered flexible parameters that can be adjusted strategically, depending on the perceived risk of acquiring the agent at the time. As with proportional risk sampling, in which sampling units are targeted for sampling in proportion to their risk, the frequency of sampling also can be a function of the risk of acquiring the agent. Proportional risk sampling frequency, therefore, would test animals or herds at a rate that was proportional to their risk; herds with a high perceived risk would be sampled proportionately more often than those with a low risk. Similarly, sampling frequency could be increased during periods of heightened risk and be decreased after an elevated risk has abated.
Sample size. As demonstrated in studies of herdlevel sensitivity, 23, 29 the probability of detecting an infected animal in a herd or population can be increased by increasing the number of animals and/or herds in the sample. Generally, the ability to identify infected and uninfected herds depends on 1) the number of infected herds, 2) the Se and Sp of the assay, 3) the prevalence of infection in the herd being tested, and 4) the number of animals tested in the herd. A sampling scheme that tests many animals and herds has more power to detect an agent or infected animal, compared with a scheme that tests relatively fewer animals, particularly if the agent or disease is rare. 13 As indicated in Table 1 , a sample size of about 300 would be required for one to be 95% ''confident'' that an infected animal could be detected if the prevalence of infection in the herd or population was 1%. These estimated sample sizes apply to determining the number of herds in a population of herds to be included for sampling as well. If only 1% of the herds is infected, several hundred herds will have to be sampled to detect 1 of the infected herds. Overall surveillance Se S , therefore, is a direct function of sample size; as sample size increases, the probability of detecting an infected animal or herd increases, provided the sampling is directed to populations likely to have the disease.
Composite and pooled sampling. Ideally, surveillance systems for FADs should be designed to have a high level of temporal sensitivity (as described below), with the expectation of very early detection after the agent enters the herd or country. Thus, the sample size necessary for early detection of an agent that is present initially in only 1 or very few herds and in only a few animals within a herd would necessarily have to be quite large. The economic reality, however, will likely preclude the massive individual herd and animal sampling necessary for early detection of very rare agents. Consequently, sampling strategies, such as aggregate or pooled sample testing, 24 may need to be incorporated into surveillance system sampling configurations that permit a broad detection capability, without the need for a large number of individual animal samplings. Examples include bulk milk tank samples, fluids or juices from slaughterhouses, waste effluent, and air samples. Because there may be some loss in overall sensitivity associated with dilution of samples, use of composite or aggregate sample approaches should be considered only when the assay Se A is very high. Another approach appropriate for very low prevalence agents involves the pooling of individual samples. 24 The procedure involves the testing of pooled samples and retesting only individual samples in pools that tested positive. The ideal size of the pools depends on the prevalence of the agent, the cost, and the sensitivity of the assay.
Spatial-temporal dependency and limitations
A surveillance system limitation in detecting infectious agents for a population of herds is that the system operates with the spatial-temporal relationships created by the scheduled sampling and sampling frame of herds and animals. For a given point in time, a surveillance system operates for the specific animal, herd, or region that was tested at that time; for other times, different animals, herds, or regions are examined by the surveillance system. Thus, even though the objective of a surveillance system may be to detect a specific agent in a particular population, at any particular time the system is functionally capable of detecting the agent only for those animals that were tested in specified herds and locations. Consequently, a spatial-temporal ambiguity exists for large-scale surveillance systems examining multiple herds at multiple times. Results do not relate to the aggregate of all herds and animals at the same time; rather, surveillance results represent a collective of individual determinations taken at different times for different animals, herds, or locations within the greater population. Consequently, the success or failure of a surveillance system to detect an agent at some particular time may not necessarily apply to all animals or all herds in the sampling frame.
Temporal sensitivity
Temporal sensitivity is the probability of detecting an agent in a given time period and refers to the ability of the system to detect the agent early, as opposed to late. Generally, temporal sensitivity would be higher for a surveillance system that tests more frequently, focuses on detecting early disease transition states, uses a larger sample size, or applies proportional risk weights to sample selection, size, and testing frequency. Suppose one is considering testing cows for mycoplasma mastitis either at 6-month intervals or at 3month intervals, and the Se of the assay is 0.90. If one applies the 3-month test interval, the probability of detecting an infected cow at the first 3-month test is 0.90, whereas if the 6-month test interval is used, the probability of detecting an infected cow after 3 months obviously is 0 (3-month Se T ϭ 0) because the cow was not tested for 6 months.
The cumulative temporal sensitivity, Se CT , refers to the probability of eventually detecting the agent. The Se CT is the cumulative probability of detection in some defined time period after repeated sampling and testing of an animal or herd and, as expected, would be greater for frequent testing than for infrequent testing. For example, if a cow that freshened with mycoplasma mastitis was tested 6 months later with the same test considered above, the probability she would be detected at the 6-month test would be 0.9. If she was tested at two 3-month intervals instead, the probability she would test positive in the first 3-month test would be 0.9, and the probability she would fail to test positive (false negative), would be 1 Ϫ 0.9 ϭ 0.1. If she failed to test positive at the 3-month test and was tested again 3 months later at the 6-month test, the probability that she would then test positive would be 0.1 ϫ 0.9, or 0.09. The cumulative probability that the infected cow would be detected at the end of 6 months would be the probability of detection at the first 3month test plus the probability of detection at the second 3-month test, or 0.9 ϩ 0.09 ϭ 0.99, which is greater than the 0.9 probability associated with 6-month testing. Another way of expressing this probability for 2 tests would be P ϭ 1 Ϫ (1 Ϫ Se) 2 or 1 Ϫ (0.1) 2 ϭ 0.99. Increasing sampling frequency, therefore, is a means of increasing overall temporal Se of surveillance.
As noted above, temporal sensitivity also is a function of disease transition state Se, whereby systems that employ an assay or test that detects the disease or agent early in the infection process, as opposed to later, can be expected to have greater temporal sensitivity. Temporal sensitivity would be lower for an FMD surveillance system that relied on detection of clinical signs, for example, than for a system that relied on detection of the virus because clinical signs usually appear several days after the virus is first shed. 8 Improvement in overall surveillance sensitivity associated with increasing sample size, as indicated for herd-level sensitivity, will tend to increase the probability of detection sooner than later, thereby also generally improving the temporal sensitivity of the system. To summarize, temporal sensitivity may be increased by targeting early disease transition states for agent detection; increasing the sample size; targeting high-risk herds or groups; increasing the size or number of replicate tissue samples collected; and increasing the frequency of sampling, including use of proportional risk estimates in determining relative sampling frequencies.
Information senescence
Another temporal property of surveillance is that sampling or testing frequency defines the temporal lag function of a surveillance system and influences the extent to which surveillance results represent the contemporary state of the population. As time increases after sampling, the information obtained from the sample ages and becomes less and less extant. Senescent surveillance data adversely affect confidence in the surveillance system information in general; one has more confidence in inferences made with current information than with older, less contemporary information that may not reflect recent events or realities. For example, one can be less certain that the USA currently does not have classical swine fever on the basis of surveillance information from samples collected 1 month ago than samples collected 1 week ago.
Surveillance system results and output
Ideally, an estimate of the probability of infection should accompany test results so that one would have some understanding of the certainty (or uncertainty) in the test result. Probability estimates can be obtained from positive and negative predictive values, which require estimates of Se and Sp, or, alternatively, from the probability diagnostic assignment (PDA) method. 28 The PDA method avoids the need for Se and Sp estimates and can be used for continuous data, such as serologic results. A probability estimate indicates the degree of confidence in knowing whether an animal is infected. A value of 0.95 would indicate a high degree of confidence in the result, whereas a value of, say, 0.45 would indicate a low degree of confidence.
In summary, surveillance represents a formal diagnostic system designed to maximize the probability of early agent detection in a population while minimizing the probability of false-positive results. Surveillance design should be directed toward capturing the target agent in a sample from an infected animal or environment and toward maximizing the likelihood of detecting the agent in the sample submitted. The sampling architecture developed for a specific agent and population with specific disease transition dynamics determines the probability that an agent in a sample or spec-imen from an infected animal in an infected herd will be presented to the assay for testing. The sensitivity and specificity of the screening and verification assays determine the probability of accurately identifying the agent once it has been presented to the assay. These concepts are presented here in an effort to foster surveillance system development, particularly for FAD agents.
